We measure the returns to attending a highly ranked law school using the "After the JD" survey of lawyers …rst passing the Bar Exam in 2000. In 2002, those lawyers that went to top 10 law schools made, on average, 25% more than those that went to schools ranked 11-20 and over 50% more than those that went to schools ranked 21-100. Graduates of Top 10 schools were also much more likely to work in large law …rms in leading law markets. We use two methods to assess the degree of selection in the law school prestige premium -the methods developed by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005), who focus on the relationship between observable and unobservable variables, and propensity score matching. Our analysis suggests that only a small portion of the large returns to law school reputation are due to selection. We use NLSY data to contrast our law school results with the e¤ect of undergraduate prestige on income and conclude that the selection issue is more important in explaining the undergraduate premium than the law school premium. We conclude that either there is a large causal e¤ect of going to a top law school or selection based on unobservables is much more important for law schools than for undergraduate schools.
partners from St. Johns. 4 Apart from these examples of very successful lawyers from less prestigious schools, the fact that the most prestigious law schools are able to attract candidates with the most impressive backgrounds suggests that a large part of the association between law school prestige and lawyer success could be due to selection e¤ects. As we will discuss, there is a large literature indicating that much of the relationship between undergraduate school selectivity and labor market outcomes is due to better schools attracting more talented students. The causal e¤ect of undergraduate school prestige on wages is not generally considered to be large. The selection component of the school ranking/wage relationship might be particularly important for lawyers relative to undergraduates and other graduate students, leading to a small causal e¤ect of school prestige on labor market outcomes, because prospective employers have relatively good information about law students.
Law school grades are generally disclosed (unlike at many business schools, for example) and other honors, such as Order of the Coif and law review positions, are publicized. This may make it easier for employers to identify student ability levels independent of what school they attend.
In this paper, we use a large, representative dataset of lawyers that …rst passed the bar in 2000 to measure the relationship between law school prestige and lawyers'success in the labor market.
We …rst show that law school prestige is, on average, associated with a large wage premium and a much higher probability of holding a "prestigious" position (which we de…ne as working at a …rm with 100 or more lawyers in one of the top four geographic law markets.) Graduates of a top 10 law school (using U.S. News and World Report rankings) earn an average of 25% more than graduates of schools ranked between eleven and twenty and over 50% more than graduates of top 100 schools not in the top 20. We then spend the rest of the paper taking various approaches to separate the portion of these wage premia that is due to selection from the causal e¤ect of going to a top school.
While we …nd that selection into top schools is associated with variables that may independently a¤ect a lawyers' success, we …nd relatively little evidence that this drives the school selectivity premium. Using the methods in Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) and propensity score matching, we show that the evidence is consistent with there being a large causal e¤ect of attending a top law school and that investments by a marginal candidate in obtaining admission to a top school are generally good ex ante investments. For comparison, we perform similar analyses of the e¤ect of undergraduate school prestige using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. We …nd that the law school prestige e¤ects on labor market outcomes are larger and more robust to inclusion of control variables and matching than similar e¤ects for undergraduate institution prestige. We conclude that either there is a large causal e¤ect to going to a prestigious law school and/or that selection based on unobservables that predict labor market success is more important for law school admissions than it is for undergraduate admissions.
Despite the large literature on the e¤ects of college quality measures on earnings, we do not know of any prior study of the e¤ects of law school reputation on earnings. 5 Given that the number of people going to law school or other graduate schools has increased substantially in recent years, it seems worthwhile to understand how the prestige of these schools relates to labor market outcomes.
In fact, the prestige e¤ects of law and other trade schools may be of more interest to education consumers and policy makers than the returns to college quality measures because the primary goal of professional schools is to advance their students'careers. If there is little or no …nancial return to going to Harvard instead of University of Massachusetts as an undergraduate, one may still justify attending Harvard based on the non-pecuniary value of an elite liberal arts education. While there are similar non-pecuniary advantages of attending law school at Harvard instead of University of Massachusetts, we would expect these to be a less important consideration.
Our paper is related to several other literatures in labor economics, the economics of education, and studies of the legal profession. We discuss the relevance of prior studies on the e¤ects of undergraduate school quality in detail in the next section. See Galanter and Palay (1991) and Galanter and Henderson (2008) for background on the traditional partner track at large and prestigious law …rms. Ehrenberg (1989) looks at the relationship between pay and law school prestige, but his analysis is at the school level and makes no attempt to separate selection and value-added. Spurr (1987) shows that lawyers from better law schools work for more prestigious …rms, on average, and handle legal issues with greater stakes. Rosen (1992) describes many facets of the lawyer labor market, including determinants of pay, variation in pay, and growth in the overall market. Henderson and Morriss (2006) analyze law schools' attempts to appear prestigious and how students respond to these in terms of attendance choices.
In the only other study that relates labor market outcomes to graduate school quality, Arcidiacono et al. (2008) study the e¤ects of getting an MBA on wages. In speci…cations similar to ours, they …nd a large premium (20-25%) for going to a Top 25 MBA program relative to other schools but a very small di¤erence between Top 10 and Top 11-25 schools. The premiums that they …nd for Top 25 programs are cut roughly in half when they control for individual …xed e¤ects using pre-MBA salary. We cannot use a similar strategy because we do not have pre-law salary data for our sample and because, unlike MBAs, many lawyers have limited or no work experience before law school. Most of our sample went straight from undergraduate school to law school or waited just one year in between.
In the next section, we provide background on the challenge in measuring the e¤ect of going to a highly ranked school on labor market outcomes and how contributors to the literature on the returns to college selectivity have dealt with this. Section 3 describes the data we use and then shows our empirical analysis using standard regression methods that control for as many indicators of unobserved skill as we can. We attempt to assess the importance of unobserved variables by measuring the degree to which observed and unobserved variables would have to interact if there were no causal e¤ect of law school reputation on labor market outcomes in Section 4 and by using propensity score matching methods in Section 5. We interpret the implications of our results for aspiring lawyers and speculate on possible sources of the law school prestige premium in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Background on Returns to Selective Schools
As has been widely studied in the undergraduate context (see below for details), measuring the causal e¤ect of school reputation on labor market outcomes is di¢ cult when unobservable factors such as intelligence and parental investments a¤ect both the school someone attends and her eventual productivity in the workplace. Suppose that person i's productivity (and, in equilibrium, her pay) is
where y is output or pay, x is a set of control variables such as age and family background, c is a measure of the reputation of the school she attended, is person-speci…c ability, and " is a random shock to productivity or to the measurement of productivity. If c were determined randomly conditional on x, traditional wage regressions would provide unbiased estimates of 2 , the causal e¤ect of college reputation on income. However, a more reasonable model would suggest that
That is, the college the person chooses is likely to be a function of her taste for particular types of schools ( ), the characteristics that a¤ect her productivity (x), and other characteristics that are observed by school admission o¢ cers but not by employers (z). The fact that the college choice is determined endogenously would not cause any problems in interpreting wage regressions using the speci…cation in equation (1) if were independent of c, controlling for the variables in the vector
x. This condition seems unlikely to be satis…ed, though. For example, if person i has a positive work ethic, this is likely to a¤ect productivity through and make the person's school admission application more attractive through z. In this case, a wage regression that did not have individual …xed e¤ects would attribute some of the e¤ects of to c through an upwardly biased 2 . Table 1 and Ehrenberg (1999) use a more representative sample and take a more structural approach by specifying a model for selection of college and subsequent earnings. They identify the causal e¤ect of college quality on wages by instrumenting for college choice through the costs of the school attended and through the functional form of the school choice and wage equations. They …nd results generally in line with those in Behrman et al. (1996) . However, the results in Brewer et al. (1999) are somewhat problematic because, unlike other research in this area and counter to most researchers'intuition, they …nd that selection correction is not important in measuring the e¤ect of college quality. Dale and Krueger (2002) and Black and Smith (2004) …nd much smaller e¤ects of college reputation on earnings. Dale and Krueger (2002) identify the e¤ects of college reputation by comparing earnings of people that were accepted to similar colleges but made di¤erent choices about which one to attend. They …nd essentially no e¤ect of college prestige on earnings. Black and Smith (2004) use propensity score matching techniques to control for school selection. They …nd that, in most speci…cations and most subgroups, selection is important. Their estimated causal wage premiums are generally not large, with a maximum of about 15% for a student that attends a top quartile school relative to if she attended a bottom quartile school. Finally, Hoekstra (2009) uses a regression discontinuity approach by comparing students near the margin for getting into the top state university campus in the state. He …nds that getting into this campus, where the average SAT score is 65-90 points higher than the other campuses, leads to a zero to twenty percent increase in earnings at ages 28-33. 6 The variety in the estimated e¤ects of college quality suggests that this e¤ect can be quite heterogeneous and/or that it is di¢ cult to specify the proper selection correction to separate the selection and value-added e¤ects of school quality measures on earnings. But we generally read the results as suggesting that selection is an important component in the correlation between undergraduate school quality and labor market outcomes and think the estimates of the causal e¤ect of college quality are generally small on the margins that most students consider. We suspect that few students that attend Wellesley College seriously consider Mankato State University, for example, or that many students that end up at top schools were ever seriously at risk for attending a school in the bottom quartile.
Below, we produce our own (fairly small) estimates of the causal e¤ect of undergraduate college quality on earnings. But the real innovation in our work is to look at the e¤ect of law school quality so our undergraduate estimates are primarily for comparison.
3 Data and Simple Regressions
Data
Our lawyer data comes from the …rst wave of the "After the JD" survey, conducted in May 2002.
The survey was conducted primarily by mail and phone (with a few responses done over the internet) and had a 70% response rate. We only used the 2,621 eligible responses from the mail and internet surveys, however, as the phone survey did not gather the background characteristics that are critical to our analysis. We dropped people that were 40 or older when they …rst passed the bar and anyone who failed to report her law school, age, gender, whether her mother was born in the United States, how she paid for law school, and whether she lived near her mother at the time of the survey. Our wage regressions are limited to the 2,037 respondents for whom we have fairly complete data. The sample size is slightly larger (2,208) when we run probits on whether the person works at a large …rm in a major legal market because some people provided detail on the type of job they hold but not on their incomes.
Panel A of Our analysis below will focus on two dependent variables. The …rst of these is the log of the person's annual earnings and the second is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the person works at a private law …rm with more than 100 lawyers and in one of the top four legal markets (New York, Washington DC, Chicago, and Los Angeles). The pay di¤erences suggest that those going to Top 10 schools earn more than 40% more than the sample as a whole and 25% more than those going to Top 11-20 schools. The table also shows that Top 10 graduates are also much more likely to work for a large law …rm in a top law market. These raw di¤erences in pay, type of job, GPA, and background make two things clear -those who go to more selective schools are more successful (at least early in their careers) and had advantages of various kinds even before law school that could be a¤ecting these post-law-school outcomes. 8 The rest of the paper attempts to give a sense for how much of the raw di¤erences in pay and type of job shown in Table 2 are due to selection of the most promising lawyers by the best schools and how much is caused by the law schools people attend.
For comparison purposes, we use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). This is a panel survey of over 12,000 people that were between the ages of 14 and 21 when the survey began in 1979. To make our analysis comparable to the AJD survey, in terms of the age of the population, we use a cross-section of respondents in 1990 (though many of the background variables are gathered from earlier survey years.) Because our goal is to look at the e¤ect of college quality measures, we limit the sample to people that have completed at least two years of college, those that report the college they attended, and those who provided compensation data in 1990. 9 We divided the colleges attended into quintiles such that the top and second group are similar proportions of the NLSY sample as the Top 10 and Top 20 groups are of the AJD sample. We de…ne the Top Tier of colleges as those where the average combined SAT score (according to US News and World Report, as of 1991) is above 1120 and the second tier includes schools with an average SAT score above 1040 and not greater than 1120. 10 Panel B of Table 2 displays summary information for the sample we use in our wage regressions below and for those portions of the sample that went to the highest and second highest school tiers. As with the AJD sample, the NLSY sample is about half male and averages about thirty years of age (though the age variation is smaller because NLSY ages only vary by up to six years whereas our AJD sample includes people between 25 and 39.) As with the lawyers, the NLSY respondents at better schools come from families with more education and they are more likely to live somewhere di¤erent from where they grew up. Again, those going to better schools both make more after school and show more skill before school (as measured by SAT scores), so it is not entirely clear whether the school quality/wage correlation is due to selection or a causal e¤ect of school quality on earnings. Table 3 schools. The results show that selection is likely to be very important. For example, lawyers with at least one parent that graduated from college have a 5.3 percentage point higher probability of going to a Top 10 school when looking at the whole sample (column 1) and more than a twelve percentage point higher probability when focusing on those that went to Top 20 schools (column 2). Having an undergraduate GPA above 3.5 also has a highly signi…cant (statistically and economically) e¤ect on whether the person attends a Top 10 law school. The third column shows a regression where the dependent variable is 1 if the person went to an unaccredited school, 2 if she went to a US News Tier 4 school, and so on up to 6 for lawyers from Top 10 schools. Having a parent that graduated from college is associated with going to a law school that is 0.355 levels higher on this scale and a high GPA is associated with about two thirds of a level higher school. Holding other factors constant, minorities attend higher ranked schools, which could be the result of a¢ rmative action.
Panel B shows similar analyses for undergraduate schools using the NLSY sample. Each additional year of mother's education is associated with an increase of 0.7 percentage points in the probability of the respondent going to a school in the highest tier (column 1) and this increase is 2.6 percentage points when limiting the sample to those in the top two college tiers. High rank within high school class and SAT scores are, not surprisingly, also closely related to the quality of the college attended. Column 3 shows results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is 1 for those that went to schools with average SATs of 770 and increases in steps to 5 for those in the top tier. This analysis shows that being in the top 10% of a respondent's high school class leads, on average, to going to a school that is 0.07 levels higher on this scale. 11
OLS Regressions of Income
We begin by estimating equation (1) Table 4 .
Column 1 reports results with no control variables, so it provides an indication of the average di¤erences in lawyer pay across six levels of US News and World Report school rankings. The omitted category in each regression is schools in the Top 10, so all other ranks are relative to this top group. Column 1 makes it clear that there are very substantial di¤erences in pay based on where lawyers went to school. Lawyers in schools ranked 11-20 earn approximately 25% less, on average than those in Top 10 schools. Those in schools ranked 21-100 earn another 25% or so less.
Lawyers from Top 10 schools average pay of almost $123K, while those from Top 11-20 schools earn about $98K. Lawyers at "Tier 4" schools (for example, North Carolina Central University, Ohio Northern University, Texas Wesleyan University, and Whittier Law School) earn an average of about $63K. We know, therefore, that there is a large wage premium associated with going to a higher ranked law school. The goal for the rest of the paper is to decompose this premium into a part attributable to observable characteristics, part due to unobservable characteristics that people have before attending law school, and a causal e¤ect provided by attending a top school.
Column 2 adds controls for gender, marital status, age (indicators for 25-29, 30-34, etc.) , and race (indicators for Black, Hispanic, Native American, Asian, and Other). Some of these control variables are important and they add considerable explanatory power to the regression, as measured by the r-square. Women in the sample earn approximately 14% less than men (though this di¤erence disappears when we look at hourly pay.) However, adding these controls does not have any e¤ect on the relationship between law school rank and pay. If we thought these control variables were su¢ cient to control for human capital di¤erences among the lawyers (which we do not), we could conclude that the average di¤erences in lawyer pay across law schools measured in Column 2 is entirely caused by the law schools.
The speci…cation in column 3 adds several controls for family background and the way the di¢ cult to interpret, we report the OLS results instead. lawyer paid for law school, including whether the lawyer lives near her mother, whether her mother was born in the United States, mother's education, father's education, whether any of her parents or grandparents are lawyers, and the fraction of law school expenses paid through savings and by parents. These variables add some explanatory power and some are signi…cant predictors of lawyer income. However, once again the additional controls have no e¤ect on the law school prestige relationship with pay.
Finally, column 4 includes our fullest set of controls where we try to capture ability through measures of prior academic success and the cost of law school. Added control variables now include whether the person went to a public law school, undergraduate GPA (indicators for 3.75-4, 3.5-3.74, etc.), an indicator variable for being in the top 10% of her undergraduate class, undergraduate major (indicators for science, business, social science, humanities, and other/missing), and an indicator variable for other graduate degrees. Once again, the additional control variables matter and help explain the variation in lawyer pay. For example, lawyers in the top decile of their undergraduate class earn 8% more, on average, than other lawyers. This set of control variables is not ideal, as we would also like to know information such as the quality of the undergraduate school and the lawyer's LSAT scores. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that, even with all these control variables, lawyers from Top 10 schools still earn 20% more than those at schools ranked 11-20. The control variables have even a smaller e¤ect at lower law school tiers, where we might have expected the characteristics to be very di¤erent than those of lawyers from top schools. While the results in Table 4 do not necessarily mean that there is a large causal e¤ect of attending a selective law school, they certainly do not rule out this possibility. Table 5 limits the analysis to lawyers from Top 20 schools in order to focus the analysis on a somewhat more homogeneous sample. If the e¤ects of some of the control variables are much di¤erent for lawyers that go to lower tier schools than for those that go to top schools, for example, then the restriction imposed in Table 4 (that the control variables have linear and constant e¤ects for the whole AJD sample) would limit the ability of these variables to properly control for factors that could a¤ect our school selectivity estimates. This does not appear to be a major concern, however, as the results for the di¤erences between lawyers from Top 10 schools and those ranked 11-20 in Table 5 are almost identical to those in Table 4 . Controls for family background and how lawyers paid for law school lower the top school premium by about one tenth while, in this limited sample, prior academic success does not a¤ect the results. This is further evidence consistent with school prestige having a causal e¤ect on pay, though still certainly not de…nitive proof. rank is self-reported, and may be subject to considerable recall bias. 13 Due to these data problems, we do not use class rank in our formal analysis, but two patterns in the graph are instructive nonetheless. First, pay shows no evidence of declining with law school class rank at Top 10 schools but does drop o¤ appreciably at other levels. Second, pay at Top 10 schools is higher at all but the highest class ranks (as well as for the large group of Top 10 graduates that did not provide a class rank) than pay at any class rank of any other school. 14 While certainly not proof of the causal e¤ect of going to a top school, the …gure is consistent with the hypothesis that top students at schools outside the Top 10 could expect to earn more if they went to a Top 10 school, even if they were further down in the quality distribution at that school.
For comparison purposes, Table 6 shows the results of similar regressions on the NLSY crosssection in 1990. To make the sample comparable to our lawyer sample, we include only people with at least two years of college. Black and Smith (2004) use the same data, though they use the 1998 cross-section. They point out that, when trying to identify the causal e¤ect of school reputation on income, it is somewhat debatable whether to include years of schooling as an explanatory variable.
People that go to better schools are more likely to complete more education. So, if one of the ways going to a better school increases earnings is by increasing completed education, controlling for education will lead to understating the e¤ect of school quality on pay. We therefore think estimates without years of education would be the best indication of the e¤ect of college quality on earnings and would leave it out of our regressions if this were our primary goal. However, we are only using the NLSY for the purposes of comparing the e¤ect of undergraduate school prestige to law school prestige. Given that the lawyers in our sample are homogeneous in terms of their education level, we include years of education in our NLSY regression so that, in both samples, we are measuring the e¤ect of school quality independent of its e¤ect on how much schooling the person gets. 15 Similarly, tenure on their current job is very homogeneous for the AJD sample but quite variable for the NLSY sample, so we control for months of tenure on the current job throughout the analysis below.
As column 1 of Table 6 shows, college quality does not appear to be an important determinant of pay in this sample. The average person in the highest tier of colleges (which is the excluded category in the regression) earns an average of 6% more than a person in the second tier. But this e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant. The top tier premium grows as college quality drops but the di¤erence only becomes statistically and economically signi…cant when reaching schools with average SAT scores below 840. Adding controls for gender, race (black and Hispanic indicator variables), age, and marital status in column 2 actually raises the premium for going to a top school relative to a second tier school, though the di¤erence is not signi…cant. 16 These controls have a bigger e¤ect on the coe¢ cients for lower-ranked schools. When all the controls in column 4 are included, which makes the NLSY speci…cation comparable to the full set of controls used in column 4 of Table 4 for lawyers, the school quality/income relationship is much smaller than the speci…cation in column 1 without controls and the controls added in columns 2-4 have a noticeably larger e¤ect on the undergraduate school quality coe¢ cients than they have on the law school quality coe¢ cients. Tables 4 and 6 provide at least circumstantial evidence consistent with law school quality having a much larger e¤ect on lawyer income than undergraduate school quality has on income. Further, they suggest that selection is a larger component of the undergraduate selectivity e¤ect than of the 1 5 The coe¢ cient on years of education is approximately 0.08 for the regressions we run, though it drops to about 0.063 when we control for test scores. 1 6 The "female"coe¢ cient indicates a very large gender gap because we use annual earnings and women work fewer hours, on average. When we look at hourly wage, the female coe¢ cient is about -0.12. law school ranking e¤ect. The evidence is consistent with law school quality having a substantial causal e¤ect on lawyer income and a bigger e¤ect than undergraduate quality has on income.
However, we cannot draw too strong a conclusion at this point given di¤erences in composition of the NLSY and AJD samples. Also, column 5 of Table 6 adds controls for ability that are much better than those available for our lawyer sample. Speci…cally, we add controls for SATs and for a basic intelligence test (the AFQT) and …nd that this cuts the school quality coe¢ cients from column 4 roughly in half. It could well be that …ner controls for lawyer intelligence, such as LSAT scores and measures of where the lawyer went to undergraduate school, would lower our estimates of the law school quality/income relationship in Table 4 .
Our analysis thus far is limited by the fact that the AJD covers only new attorneys and by the lack of information about LSATs and undergraduate grades. We can partially address these issues by examining data from other sources. We …rst examine whether the relation (whether causal or not) between law school quality and career success continues as lawyers gain experience.
One indication that this relationship is long-term is that lawyers from top law schools are highly over-represented in the partnership of top law …rms. The data used in Oyer and Schaefer (2009) include background information for the partners of 285 of the 300 largest law …rms in the U.S.
Using this data and data on the number of people that graduated from each U.S. law school, we calculated that, as of the Summer of 2007, 13.4% of graduates of Top 10 law schools between 1970 and 2005 were partners at one of these 285 …rms. 8.9% of graduates of Top 11-20 schools and 3.5% of graduates of other Top 100 schools were partners at these …rms. The Tier 3 and 4 fractions were 1.6% and 1.1%, respectively.
The 1994-1995 Chicago Lawyers Survey provides another dataset we can use to examine how the school-quality/career-success relation changes as lawyers gain experience. This survey of lawyers based in Chicago has some important limitations for our purposes. To the extent that part of the e¤ect of law school quality is sorting lawyers into more productive locations, that will be lost when looking at lawyers in a single location. Also, the survey gathered signi…cant demographic data, but did not ask for undergraduate GPA or major. The survey does include the name of the person's undergraduate school, so we can control for quality of undergraduate school. Using the 848 lawyers in this sample for which we have su¢ cient data, we ran regressions of log annual pay on the same law school quality variables we used in Table 4 . One speci…cation includes no controls, another controls for years since law school graduation (linear and squared), indicators for female, minority, married, mother was/is a professional, father was/is a professional, either parent was/is a lawyer, grew up in Chicago, and grew up in Illinois, while the third controls for all those variables plus indicators for undergraduate school average SAT score (in 100 point increments). The results of all these speci…cations are similar (though somewhat less precisely estimated) to those in Table 4 .
The Top 10 premium relative to Top 11-20 is approximately 20%.
We used another dataset, The University of Michigan Law School Alumni Survey, to try to more directly assess the importance of not being able to control for LSAT scores, undergraduate quality, and undergraduate GPA simultaneously with the other datasets. 17 This comes at the rather steep cost of taking away our variable of interest, as there is no variation in law school quality among this group. We used data from surveys done …ve years after graduation for the classes of 1991-2000 and ran regressions of log annual pay (which is measured four years after graduation) on undergraduate GPA, LSAT percentile, fraction of law school paid for by family and savings, and indicators for female, minority, married, each graduating class, 5-year age groupings, whether the person lives in the same state as his/her parents, parent occupations (lawyer, professional, business owner), nonlaw graduate school, four undergraduate major categories, University of Michigan undergraduate degree, and Ivy League/Seven Sisters undergraduate degree. Within this one school, very little of the variation in wages can be explained -even with all these controls, the r-square of the regression is only 0.0677. The noteworthy …nding for our purposes is that LSAT score is not signi…cantly related to pay in this regression. Also, whether LSAT score, undergraduate school, and undergraduate GPA are included or not has no e¤ect on the other variables in the regression.
Of course, whether including these variables would have an e¤ect on a school quality measure is not known and it seems plausible that, to the extent LSAT scores predict earnings, they do so across rather than within law schools. However, these results provide at least a bit of evidence that LSAT scores, undergraduate school quality, and undergraduate success do not explain lawyer pay accurately and to the exclusion of other variables.
Job Quality Probits
It seems unlikely that any given employer of lawyers would vary pay for new lawyers based on where they went to school, so we expect the return to selective law schools to operate largely by sorting lawyers from more selective schools into higher paying …rms. We now look for evidence of this sorting by analyzing the relationship between law school prestige and the propensity of lawyers to work in the highest-paying segment of the law sector. Private law …rms are the highest paying jobs, on average, for new lawyers, with compensation considerably greater than pay in the public sector, as in-house counsel, or other jobs law graduates take. 18 Opportunity to work on the most interesting and lucrative work is generally considered to be greatest in the largest legal markets (see Garicano and Hubbard (2009) ), so we focus on the four largest legal markets -New York, Washington, Los Angeles, and Chicago. Table 7 contains the results of probit regressions where the dependent variable equals one if the AJD respondent works at a private law …rm with at least 100 lawyers in one of the four largest legal markets. The coe¢ cients in the table are the marginal e¤ect of a one unit change in the explanatory variable, so the coe¢ cient of -0.071 on "Rank 11-20" in column 1 means that graduates of Top 11-20 schools are 7 percentage points less likely to hold one of these top jobs than a Top 10 graduate when we do not include any controls. That is a very large di¤erence, given that approximately 13% of the AJD sample works in one of these top jobs.
Moving to the right of the table and adding controls, we …nd that about a third of the top job/top school relationship can be explained with controls for pre-law-school academic history. Top 10 graduates have a 4.6 percentage point advantage in these sought-after jobs when we add our full set of controls. The e¤ects of the control variables in Table 7 on the e¤ect of going to a top school mirrors that of the control variables in Table 4 which supports the hypothesis that the e¤ect of school selectivity on earnings comes through sorting lawyers into higher paying …rms. 19 
Using Observables to Assess Selection Bias
We now follow Altonji et al. (2005) and consider how the relationship between unobservable factors, the schools lawyers attend, and their future careers may a¤ect the interpretation of our results. 20 It is simplest to do this when looking at two endogenous indicator variables rather than an indicator variable (top school) and a linear variable (pay). Consider the following three equation system: 
We use two y indicator variables that capture success at the time of the interview, the indicator for working in a 100+ lawyer …rm in a top four market that we analyzed in Table 7 and an indicator variable for having income greater than $100K per year. The results in Table 7 are estimates of equation (4) under the assumption that = 0. If we had a credible instrument for school quality or were willing to make strong functional form assumptions, we could estimate . As a substitute for that, we now estimate the three equation system above, making various assumptions about the value of . We start with = 0, which is what we have been doing to this point and tells us the value of if the variables in x fully control for the endogeneity of school quality. Then we use bivariate probits and increase in steps until it is no longer statistically signi…cant and, eventually, changes sign. This tells us how large has to be for selection to fully explain the relationship between school quality and our measures of y. (3) and (4) might be. We do know that the correlation between the school prestige and pay indicator variables for the sample and groups in column 1 of Panel A of Table 8 is 0.2381, which means that the correlation of the disturbances with the full set of controls we have available would have to be just as great as the correlation of the variables themselves if selection fully explains the school prestige relationship with pay. In other words, the controls we have would have to be essentially uncorrelated with the unobservables that are driving both selection and pay. That is not implausible but also does not strike us as likely.
Column 4 of Panel A shows that the message is quite di¤erent when looking at college quality and the NLSY sample. The bivariate probit in that column is limited to NLSY respondents in the two highest college quality groups and the pay indicator variable is de…ned at roughly the median for this sample. The e¤ect of college prestige is small and insigni…cant even with no controls and gets noticeably smaller (though not by a statistically signi…cant amount) when we add the controls in column 4 of Table 6 (that is, controls similar to those we have available for the lawyer sample.)
The estimated e¤ect of college quality turns negative at very low levels of . While we do not know what level of is reasonable for either sample, Panel A provides further evidence that selection in college prestige is more important than in law school prestige and is consistent with a larger causal e¤ect of law school reputation than undergraduate school reputation. In later drafts, we hope to make further use of the methods in Altonji et al. (2005) and include analyses that will allow us to make informed estimates of .
Panel B of Table 8 
Propensity Score Matching
We now use propensity score matching as another means of controlling for selection into high prestige schools. Our NLSY analysis is quite similar to that of Black and Smith (2004) , though we use slightly di¤erent samples and variables and we do not separate our analysis by gender.
Our lawyer analysis is similar in spirt to Black and Smith (2004) , but the sample and variables are completely di¤erent. This allows us to interpret our propensity score matching results for lawyers relative to college students and to use the importance of selection in college choice as a benchmark. Black and Smith (2004) provide a very useful and intuitive discussion of the bene…ts and drawbacks of using propensity score matching in this context (see section 5 of their paper.)
Basically, we observe a "treated" population, which is those who went to Top 10 law schools, and an "untreated"population, which is those who went to lower ranked schools. We will analyze each tier of law school (and, when using the NLSY sample, college) separately relative to Top 10 (Top Tier) schools.
As we have shown above, and especially in Table 3 , assignment of c is not random and it is di¢ cult to estimate the treatment e¤ect of going to a top school, which, in the notation of equations (3) and (4), can be expressed as E(y c=1 y c=0 jc = 1). Our prior regressions measured E(y c=1 y c=0 jx), leaving open the possibility that some unobservable factors not captured by x a¤ects both c and y. By matching each person for whom c = 1 to a person with very similar x, we can relax the assumption in our previous regressions that linear controls for x eliminate selection bias. However, matching requires that Pr(c = 1jX) < 1 for all x -that is, for any given x, there must be some person that does not go to a top tier law school. Whereas in the regression context, we wanted to add as many controls as possible to the x vector to minimize selection bias, matching people based on a larger set of x variables can lead to what is commonly known as the "curse of dimensionality." That is, if conditioning on enough x variables leads to a set of people that all attended top schools, there will be nobody in the untreated group with whom these people can be matched. As a result, in some of our comparisons between top tier schools and other tiers, we have to drop some covariates and hope that these are not the key variables that drive both school selectivity and ability.
We implement matching using the nearest neighbor method and the Stata programs described in Becker and Ichino (2002) . 21 Panel A of Table 9 presents our results for the AJD sample of lawyers. Lawyers from unaccredited schools are su¢ ciently di¤erent in observable characteristics from lawyers at top schools that we do not include unaccredited lawyers in the analysis. The results for the other types are clear -matching does nothing to reduce the estimated e¤ect of going to a more selective law school relative to our OLS estimates with the full set of controls (Column 4 of Table 4 ). The propensity score matching estimate of the causal e¤ect of going to a Top 10 school on income is roughly 30% and estimates relative to other school tiers are also quite large. These matching results do nothing to suggest that selection drove our earlier large estimates of the causal e¤ect of law school reputation.
Panel B of the same table presents propensity score matching estimates of the returns to college quality measures for the NLSY sample. This serves two purposes. First, comparing the estimates in column 1 of Panel B to those in Column 4 of Table 6 (which includes similar control variables)
shows that propensity score matching and OLS lead to similar conclusions in the undergraduate context, as well. This set of control variables for the NLSY is most similar to our full set of control variables for the AJD sample, so it may be the most appropriate comparison for our purposes.
These results are consistent with the …ndings of Black and Smith (2004) , at least for men and they provide further con…rmation that undergraduate college prestige has relatively little e¤ect on earnings. Also, they provide some level of reassurance about our law school …ndings because the relationship between the OLS and propensity score matching results are similar for the college and law school samples. Second, column 2 of Table 9 , Panel B adds two "intelligence"measures, AFQT and SAT scores, to the NLSY matching analysis. A comparison of these results to those in column 1 shows that the addition of these intelligence measures has only a trivial e¤ect on the coe¢ cients except at the second tier (average SATs between 1041 and 1120) schools and, even at those schools, the change is insigni…cant. This comparability between column 1 and column 2 suggests that the lack of direct intelligence measures may not be driving our results for law schools and that matching on the types of variables we have in the AJD sample may be su¢ cient.
Interpretation

Investments by Aspiring Lawyers
We now use these estimates of the …nancial returns to attending a selective law school for simple thought experiments that show the implications for law school applicants and as an opportunity to consider the plausibility of our estimates. Consider a law school applicant that, with probability one, can get into a law school ranked approximately …ftieth. 22 She would like to attend Stanford Law School (the representative top 10 school for this analysis) if at all possible and, if not, she prefers UCLA (our representative school ranked in the second ten) to the options ranked around …ftieth.
To formulate estimates of the probability that a student will get into Stanford and UCLA, we use self-reported admissions outcomes from lawschoolnumbers.com of people that applied for Fall 2008 entry to law school. We cannot be sure that people report reliably, but the website is anonymous so there is little incentive to misreport. More problematically, we have no idea whether there is selection bias as to who participates in this voluntary website and whether people that report outcomes here are more or less likely than others to get in. So these admissions probabilities should be thought of as having wide standard errors. We approximate admissions probabilities for individual schools within 5-point LSAT ranges.
Suppose our hypothetical aspiring lawyer received a score of 163 on the LSAT. One out of a total of 25 people with LSAT scores between 160 and 164 report being admitted to Stanford so we assume our lawyer has a 4% probability of getting into Stanford. Five out of 65 UCLA applicants with LSAT scores in this range report being admitted, so she has a 7.6% chance of being admitted there. Assume maximum admissions correlation (that is, all applicants that are admitted to Stanford are also admitted to UCLA). If our lawyer does nothing to increase her LSAT score, she will go to Stanford with 4% probability, UCLA with 3.6% probability, and the school ranked around …ftieth with 92.4% probability.
Our estimates of her expected income are based on a survey of Stanford Law School alumni that was conducted in 2007 and included just over 1,000 alumni from the classes of 1987-2006. These respondents were asked, "What is your total annual income, before taxes, from your CURRENT job?
Please include salary, bonuses, pro…t sharing, and any other direct …nancial compensation." They were asked to check a box for no income, under $50K, $50K-$99K, $100K-$199K, $200K-$399K, $400K-$599K, $600K-$2million, or over $2 million. We assign the midpoint of each category and $3 million for those earning over $2 million. There were 790 valid responses. We took the average income by graduating class and, after discounting by zero (this would assume that discounting will be exactly outweighed by the increase in earnings for lawyers with a given number of years of experience in the time between graduation and when the person reaches that level of seniority), 5%, or 10%, added these up as an estimate of what an aspiring lawyer attending Stanford could expect to earn over the …rst twenty years after graduation. These averages are $6 million for zero discounting, $3.5 million when discounting by 5%, and $2.25 million when applying a 10% discount rate. We assume that these are our lawyer's expected earnings if she goes to Stanford, that her earnings are 81.8% of these …gures if she goes to UCLA (which is based on the -0.201 coe¢ cient in Column 4 of Table 4 ), and that her earnings are 66.8% of the Stanford level if she goes to a school ranked …ftieth (based on the -0.403 in Column 4 of Table 4 ).
Column 1 of Table 10 shows that, given these assumptions, our lawyer's expected income with her LSAT of 163 is just over $4 million if she does not discount future income streams, $2.4 million if she discounts at 5%, and $1.54 million if she discounts at 10%. 23 Column 2 shows that our lawyer's chances of getting into a Top 10 or Top 20 school and, therefore, her income are enhanced signi…cantly if she can increase her LSAT scores by 5 points. If she does not discount, …ve LSAT points are worth over $700,000 in expectation and nearly $300,000 if she discounts by the full 10%.
argument to be had for attending UCLA or the lower ranked school? Without discounting, the premium for Stanford relative to UCLA totals over $1 million and, relative to the lower-ranked school, is nearly $2 million. At 10% discounting, these …gures drop to approximately $400K and $750K, respectively. Assuming room and board costs would be roughly the same at each school (they could be lower outside Silicon Valley and Los Angeles, but not by enough to a¤ect this decision), the key di¤erence is tuition. Stanford tuition costs $40,000 for a total of about $120,000
over the time in law school. Even if UCLA or a lower ranked school o¤ered a full tuition scholarship, the aspiring lawyer would be better o¤ in terms of expected wealth by attending Stanford. If she did not get into Stanford, it would also be worth paying UCLA's $81,000 tuition ($27,000 per year for three years) instead of taking free tuition at a lower-ranked school.
Sources of Selective School Premium
If the large premium to going to a selective law school can actually be interpreted as a causal e¤ect, we can only speculate on the underlying drivers of the e¤ect. One possibility is that the top schools actually produce, on average, more value added for their students. While this could be the case, it is hard to …gure out why the law school e¤ect appears to be larger than the e¤ect of going to a selective undergraduate school. If top schools really add much more value, it must be the case that the quality of education drops o¤ much more steeply as one drops down the law school distribution than as one drops down the college distribution. One contributing factor could be that teaching is generally taken much more seriously at top law schools (and other professional schools) than at top undergraduate programs. Alternatively, the network e¤ects of learning with higher ability classmates may be more valuable in law school.
The large e¤ect of law school reputation could also be due to an information problem on the part of employers that hire lawyers. Perhaps, even with such information as grades and honors, …rms cannot easily distinguish the ability of law students and they rely on the reputation of the law school as the primary signal of the applicant's ability. This would suggest that high ability lawyers from lower ranked law schools would catch up with lawyers from higher ranked schools as their careers develop. In future drafts of this paper, we will be able to test this idea using the second wave of the AJD survey which was conducted seven years after the lawyers …rst passed the bar.
Conclusions
We used a representative sample of lawyers that …rst passed the bar in 2000 to show that, as of 2002, there was a large wage premium associated with having gone to a highly ranked law school.
Lawyers from Top 10 schools made about 25% more than those from the next ten schools and much more than those from schools ranked further below. Lawyers from top schools were also considerably more likely to hold jobs at large …rms in top legal markets. Adding controls for various factors that might a¤ect both where a lawyer went to school and her later success did surprisingly little to lower the strong e¤ect of going to a top law school. Also, propensity score matching did not provide evidence that selection was a large contributing factor to our estimates of the school prestige relationship to labor market outcomes. We cannot say with certainty that we have identi…ed the causal e¤ect of attending a highly ranked law school, but our results are all consistent with there being a large positive wage e¤ect on going to a top school. At the least, we can safely conclude that either there is a large causal return to attending a highly ranked law school or the e¤ect of selection on unobservables is much more important for law school admissions than it is for undergraduate admissions.
In addition to further re…ning our current analysis (especially by re…ning our analysis of the relationship between observables and unobservables in Section 4), we plan to use future waves of the AJD survey to make broader and stronger conclusions about the e¤ect of law school prestige.
Wave 2 of the AJD surveyed the lawyers from wave 1 in 2007 and 2008 and will be available soon.
We will perform similar analyses to those in this paper to see if the law school prestige e¤ects are similar for lawyers with seven years of experience to those of the lawyers with two years of experience. If the AJD is able to follow through on its hopes to launch a third wave, we hope to look at even more seasoned lawyers and to include some questions on the third questionnaire that will allow us to better correct for selection into top law schools. Result Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman (1996) Female twin pairs.
Paper
Comparison
Attending Private and PhDgranting universities leads to 10-25% higher earnings. Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg (1999) Model college selection. Attending elite schools increase earnings up to 40% relative to lowranked public schools. Dale and Krueger (2002) Uses students admitted to same schools but attending di¤erent ones.
Little or no e¤ect of school SAT scores, but higher tuition leads to higher earnings. Black and Smith (2004) Propensity score matching. Attending a top quartile school increases earnings by up to 15% relative to a bottom quartile school.
Hoekstra (2009) RDD between state university campuses.
Those attending campus with +75 SAT points earn 20% more. Chicago at a …rm with 100 or more lawyers, where the correlation between the error terms in the two probits within the bivariate probit are assumed to equal the value of rho listed. Sample in each analysis is limited to the treatment and comparison groups. Control variables in all but the …rst row of each panel include age (…ve-year indicators), fraction of law school paid for by savings and family, and indicator variables for minority, female, married, living within 50 miles of lawyer's mother, mother born outside U.S., one of parents is a lawyer, public law school, in top 10GPA was 3.75 or higher, and undergraduate major was humanities or missing. 
